Important Cases

National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India

National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India* is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of India.

In this case, the honourable Court declared transgender people to be a ‘third gender’ and affirmed that the fundamental rights granted under the Constitution of India will be equally applicable to transgender people. It also gave them the right to self-identification of their gender as male, female or third-gender**. 

Further, the Apex Court has directed the Central and the State governments to take steps to treat the transgender people as socially and economically backward classes of citizens and extend all kinds of reservation in cases of admission in educational institutions and for public appointments.

Having Considered the judgment of the Apex Court in the above case, the High Court of Karnataka  has recently directed the State Government of Karnataka to take necessary and immediate steps for implementation of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 which has come into force at the end of the year 2019. 

*WP (Civil) No 400 of 2012

**Source: Wikipedia

A complaint filed on a person under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C. which does not contain the ingredients of an offence under Sections 504 & 506 of IPC cannot make the person liable for committing the offence: Supreme Court

Case Name:

VIKRAM JOHAR

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 759 of 2019

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4820/2017)

Source:- https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2017/15396/15396_2017_Judgement_26-Apr-2019.pdf

The Supreme Court held that the intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 504 of IPC.

For the convenience of the readers, Sections 503, 504 & 506 of IPC is reproduced as here under:

“503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

Explanation.— A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.

504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—

Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;

If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.“

Note:- The post ” A complaint filed on a person under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C. which does not contain the ingredients of an offence under Sections 504 & 506 of IPC cannot make the person liable for committing the offence: Supreme Court ” appeared first on jnanaganga.home.blog.

Delay in obtaining the insurance policy on behalf of a borrower by a Finance Company from its sister company amounts to deficiency of service: Supreme Court

Case Name:-

Ashatai w/o Anand Duparte

versus

Shriram City Union Finance Ltd.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3962 OF 2019

(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4925 of 2019)

Source: https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/4754/4754_2019_Judgement_16-Apr-2019.pdf

Brief facts of the case are:

The Appellant’s husband Late Anand Duparte had obtained a personal loan of Rs. 2,00,000/­- on 27.02.2015 from the Respondent – Finance Company.

The Respondent – Finance Company secured the loan by issuance of an insurance policy by its sister concern i.e. M/s Shriram General Insurance Company Ltd., on behalf of the Borrower.

In the cover note of the said policy, the Insured was shown as: M/s Shriram City Union Finance Ltd. i.e. the Respondent – Finance Company.

The 1st loan instalment of Rs. 7,933/­ was paid on 07.03.2015 by a Cheque.

The Appellant’s husband admittedly paid the premium of the insurance policy. The Respondent – Finance Company received a Demand Draft of Rs. 400/­- from the Appellant’s husband towards the insurance premium. The Group Insurance Policy was issued from 30.03.2015 to 29.03.2016.

On 17.03.2015 i.e. within 18 days after obtaining the loan, the Appellant’s husband suddenly passed away.

The Respondent – Finance Company issued a notice to the Appellant for payment of the loan instalments.

A Legal Notice dated 16.12.2015 was addressed by the Appellant to the Respondent – Finance Company,

requesting that the loan amount be recovered from the Insurance Company.

The Respondent – Finance Company replied to the Legal Notice on 29.01.2016, and denied having received the Demand Draft of Rs. 400/­- from the deceased husband of the Appellant. It was further contended that the amount of Rs. 2,120/­- was deducted from the loan amount towards processing fee and stamp charges.

(The matter went to the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, then to the State Commission, later to the National Commission and ultimately to the Supreme Court.)

The Appellant filed a Consumer Complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum.

The District Forum held that since the Appellant’s husband had paid the 1st loan instalment on 07.03.2015, it could be presumed that all the loan formalities had been completed by that date. This proved that the Appellant’s husband had paid the insurance premium soon after the loan was sanctioned.

The Respondent – Finance Company had been negligent in obtaining the policy late, since it had forwarded the premium amount to the Insurance Company after a delay of about 1 month.

It then held that there was deficiency of service on the part of the Respondent – Finance Company.

It was ordered that the Respondent – Finance Company shall not recover any amount from the Appellant towards the loan obtained by her deceased husband; and ordered compensation of Rs. 10,000/­ towards mental agony, and Rs. 3,000/­ towards Costs.

When the matter was appealed by the Company before the State Commission, the State Commission held that since the insurance premium was deducted from the loan account of the Appellant’s husband, the District Forum had rightly allowed the Consumer Complaint.

Then, a revision petition was filed by the Company in the National Commission. The National Commission set aside the Order passed by the State Commission, and allowed the Petition filed by the Respondent – Finance Company.

The Appellant has filed the present Civil Appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has erroneously set aside the Order passed by the State Commission on factually incorrect grounds.

It observed that

The revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission is a limited jurisdiction, to be exercised in case the State Commission lacked jurisdiction, or acted with illegality or material irregularity.

A perusal of the documents shows that the Respondent – Finance Company was providing a loan facility to the borrowers, which was secured by an insurance policy issued by its own sister concern viz. M/s Shriram General Insurance Company Limited. It was a composite inter­linked transaction.

The deduction of Rs.2,120/­ from the loan account was towards processing of the composite transaction.

The deceased husband of the Appellant had fulfilled his part of the transaction, by depositing Rs. 400/­- by way of the Demand Draft towards the insurance premium, and also the charges of Rs. 2,120/­- towards processing of the loan transaction.

The Respondent – Finance Company however delayed in forwarding the amount to the Insurance Company for obtaining the insurance policy, which was issued on 30.03.2015 for the period 30.03.2015 to 29.03.2016.

Hence, there was a clear deficiency of service by the Respondent – Finance Company in delay in obtaining the insurance policy from its sister concern.

The risk would be covered from the date of payment of the insurance premium. It observed that the loan was secured from the date on which the insurance premium was paid. The premium having been paid by the Appellant’s husband during his life­time, the loan was to be adjusted from the insurance policy.

It observed that the Appellant – widow has been unnecessarily dragged though legal proceedings on account of deficiency of service by the Respondent – Finance Company and directed the Respondent – Finance Company to pay Compensation of Rs. 50,000/­, and Costs of Rs. 25,000/­ to the Appellant.

Note:- The post “Delay in obtaining the insurance policy on behalf of a borrower by a Finance Company from its sister company amounts to deficiency of service: Supreme Court” appeared first on jnanaganga.home.blog. It is based on my personal understanding of the Case.

The age of a case, by itself, cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material witness: Supreme Court

Case Name:-

MANJU DEVI

Versus

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.688 OF 2019

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8315 of 2018)

Source:- https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/35230/35230_2018_Judgement_16-Apr-2019.pdf

Note:- The post “The age of a case, by itself, cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material witness: Supreme Court” appeared first on jnanaganga.home.blog.

The stage to appreciate the evidence with a view to find inconsistencies in two medical reports would arise only when the prosecution leads evidence by examining the doctors in support of the reports: Supreme Court

Case Name:

Bihari Lal

VERSUS

The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 676 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.8823 of 2018)

Source: https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/36721/36721_2018_Judgement_15-Apr-2019.pdf

The Honourable Supreme Court held that

Mere perusal of the medical reports filed by the prosecution would prima facie show that a case under Section 307 IPC is made out against the respondents and, therefore, the charge under Section 307 IPC should have been framed against respondents along with the other charges.

For convenience of the readers, Section 307 of IPC is reproduced as here under:

Section 307. Attempt to murder —

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty or murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

Attempts by life convicts —

When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.

Note:- The post “The stage to appreciate the evidence with a view to find inconsistencies in two medical reports would arise only when the prosecution leads evidence by examining the doctors in support of the reports: Supreme Court” appeared first on jnanaganga.home.blog.

A rape victim can never be called an accomplice: Supreme Court

Case Name:

Anurag Soni

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 629 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No.618/2019)

Source: https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/48211/48211_2018_Judgement_09-Apr-2019.pdf

The Supreme Court held that

……. that from the very inspection the accused had no intention to marry the victim and that he had mala fide motives and had made false promise only to satisfy the lust. But for the false promise by the accused to marry the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix would not have given the consent to have the physical relationship. It was a clear case of cheating and deception.

…… the consent given by the prosecutrix was on misconception of fact. Such incidents are on increase now­a­days. Such offences are against the society.

Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim. As observed by this Court in a catena of decisions, while a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female.

Rape reduces a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means can a rape victim be called an accomplice.

Rape leaves a permanent scar on the life of the victim. Rape is a crime against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim.

Being the most hated crime, the rape tantamounts to a serious blow to the supreme honour of a woman, and offends both her esteem and dignity.

Therefore, merely becausethe accused had married with another lady and/or even the prosecutrix has subsequently married, is no ground not to convict the appellant­ accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC.

For convenience of the readers, Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code is reproduced as here under:

Sec. 376. Punishment for rape

(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or

for a term which may extend to ten years

and

shall also be liable to fine

unless the women raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both:

Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.

(2) Whoever,—

(a) being a police officer commits rape—

(i) within the limits of the police station to which he is ap­pointed; or

(ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or

(iii) on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or

(b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or

(c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman’s or children’s insti­tution takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or

(d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or

(e) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or

(f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or

(g) commits gang rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years.

Explanation 1.—Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this sub-section.

Explanation 2.—“Women’s or children’s institution” means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected woman or children or a widows’ home or by any other name, which is established and maintained for the reception and care of woman or children.

Explanation 3.—“Hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation.

Recent Amendment* in Section 376 of the Penal Code,—

(a) in sub-section (1), for the words “shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine”, the words “shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine” shall be substituted;

(b) in sub-section (2), clause (i) shall be omitted;

(c) after sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:—

“(3) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine:

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:

Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.”.

* Source: https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/CSdivTheCriminalLawAct_14082018_0.pdf

Note:- The post “A rape victim can never be called an accomplice: Supreme Court” appeared first on jnanaganga.home.blog. It is for personal and non commercial use only.

The courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving from the matrimonial home on account of the acts of cruelty also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the IPC: Supreme Court

Case Name:

RUPALI DEVI

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.71 OF 2012

Source: https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2011/36977/36977_2011_Judgement_09-Apr-2019.pdf

The issue before the Court is

“whether a woman forced to leave her matrimonial home on account of acts and conduct that constitute cruelty can initiate and access the legal process within the jurisdiction of the courts where she is forced to take shelter with the parents or other family members”.

The Honourable Supreme Court held that

the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

For easy reference of the readers, Section 498A of IPC is reproduced as here under:

Section 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty —

Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation —For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

Note:- The post “The courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving from the matrimonial home on account of the acts of cruelty also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the IPC: Supreme Court” appeared first on https://jnanaganga.home.blog/. It is for personal and non commercial use only.

A departmental proceeding and proceedings in a criminal court are completely different: Supreme Court

Case Name:

THE SECRETARY, LUCY SEQUEIRA TRUST AND ANR.

VERSUS

KAILASH RAMESH TANDEL AND ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3456 OF 2019

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.28314 of 2017)

Source: https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2017/33107/33107_2017_Judgement_08-Apr-2019.pdf

The Supreme Court held that a departmental proceeding and proceedings in a criminal court are completely different. The purpose is different, the standard of proof is different and the approach is also different. The initiation of the process in a departmen

tal proceeding, specially on charges with which we are concerned in the present matter can never be said to be amounting to contempt of court even if the criminal proceedings were pending.

The allegations made against Respondent No.1 were of such level and dimension that an immediate action on the departmental front was required to be undertaken and such action by its very nature had to be completely independent. Whether any criminal trial was pending or not would not be having any bearing on the pending issue before the Inquiry Committee.

We have, therefore, no hesitation in observing that the approach of the Nominee of Respondent No.1 and of the State Awardee Teacher was completely wrong and unsustainable.

Note:- The Post “A departmental proceeding and proceedings in a criminal court are completely different: Supreme Court” appeared first on https://jnanaganga.home.blog/. It is for personal and non-commercial use only.